THE TRAGEDIERS

HUBERT ZIÓŁKOWSKI

Ok, getting straight to the point since intros aren't my strong suit: this is another document/manifesto I'm writing, expanding on ideas and explanations I've explored before. The motivation this time came from several debates I've had, where I found myself reexplaining things I've already written about. Through those debates, I've discovered better ways to express some of these ideas, especially using side information about traditional philosophy and reasoning. I won't go into too much detail, because much of it isn't essential. Many concepts I've previously discussed, like natcolasis and its aggregate ego, clearly parallel Gentile's actual idealism, though reinvented by me (reinvention is something I often do unconsciously.)

There are a few ideas, which I've also touched on in worldbuilding projects, that mirror my real-life views, though in those contexts they're framed within fictional lore rather than explained as positions I support in reality or how they might function in Poland. I might reference some historical figures, but I'll be upfront: I haven't read lengthy books or original theory; most of what I know comes from debates or the internet. Interestingly, the lines between what I've already explained and what comes up in debate often intersect, making it hard to track what I've already covered. Hopefully, continued writing will eventually get everything down.

Here's the outline of this document. I want to briefly discuss odznaczkowanie and connect it to the idea that privacy is overrated, not in the sense of literal nudity, but in examining why privacy is valued and why it may not be necessary. Then I'll touch on Nietzsche, highlighting my issues with him: he was right in parts but ultimately wrong, a struggle cultist. I'll discuss the struggle cult further in that section, comparing it to analogous ideas from others. After that, I plan to explore what I call "will via loyalty," which relates to concepts generally understood as liquid modernity, and how I think it could be addressed, though I'm less certain about implementation. Finally, I may include a brief overview of the real history of social nationalism, separate from my worldbuilding material.

I want to stress that I'm not a professional philosopher, my field is international relations. If I oversimplify something about a historical figure,

that’s on me. If you know more, just take my words as reflections of my understanding rather than a definitive philosophical statement. This document may end up shorter than my other works, as it’s being composed in an ad hoc manner. I decided to put it down spontaneously, and we’ll see how far it goes.

Odznaczkowanie

To get to the heart of odznaczkowanie: the term comes from the Polish *odznaka*, meaning pin or badge. In real life, this already exists in conventions, fandom circles, and some subcultures, where people literally wear badges on jackets, backpacks, or wherever. But I believe this concept could be applied much more broadly, with significant social benefits. It could act almost like a kind of social medicine for the challenges we face today: difficulty making friends, the dating crisis, and the general struggle to connect with people. Friendships sometimes evolve into relationships, but the real issue starts with simply finding your people.

We’ve all, in a sense, become a bit socially awkward. There’s a growing and very legitimate resistance to small talk and the tedious process of finding connections. Third spaces are gone, and widespread depression amplifies the problem. When people don’t spend time around others, they don’t form bonds, obviously, but what if there were a way to shortcut that process? What if we could start conversations without resorting to trivialities like the weather or other empty pleasantries? This involves a small compromise on privacy, but it is minor, manageable, and far outweighed by the benefits.

The idea is simple: people wear badges that signal key information about themselves. Consider how fans already pin favorite characters to backpacks. Now imagine this normalized and extended to everyday life. It’s not difficult logistically: a badge attached to a jacket or bag stays in place, no daily maintenance required. People could wear five or six badges at a time, each representing an important aspect of themselves. In a society where everyone dresses similarly, often in black shirts and jeans, individual differences can be hard to read, which makes social approaches awkward.

Add the modern reality that even a casual approach can be recorded or judged, and the problem becomes more pronounced. Badges serve as visible, immediate signals of shared interests, experience, and identity, making social navigation far easier.

Some badges could represent occupation, not as a status symbol, since via the removal of the cult of struggle how one makes their living would not longer be a signal of status, because who cares, but as a way to find common ground. A grocery store worker could connect with other workers, share experiences, or exchange practical advice. Others could show specific workplace or organizational affiliation, or in the case of soldiers, the division they belong to. Then there are badges representing personal interests, two or three for hobbies, media, fandoms, or passions. These are the most important, acting as direct conversation starters: if someone recognizes a badge, they can immediately engage on common ground. Finally, badges could show membership in clubs or organizations, offering a voluntary form of affiliation that signals interests without requiring exposure of private or potentially embarrassing aspects of life. For children and teens, occupational badges would naturally be replaced by school affiliation.

The benefits are clear. Badges act as compact, visible self-descriptions that accelerate social interaction, making it easier to find compatible people. They reduce the friction of introductions, bypass tedious small talk, and help foster meaningful connections. They encourage cultural transparency without enforcing conformity. Unlike attempts to standardize media or activities, badges do not require everyone to consume the same content or participate in the same hobbies. Instead, they create decentralized, voluntary signals of compatibility.

It may feel a little cringe at first, but shedding embarrassment is a form of freedom. The more people participate, the more self-propelling the system becomes. Badges encourage openness, shared experience, and stronger communities. In a society increasingly isolated by technology, depression, and the disappearance of communal spaces, badges offer a practical, low-

cost method to make social navigation, friendship, and even potential romantic connections easier.

Ultimately, odznaczkowanie could become a cultural habit worth promoting. Governments and social institutions could support it, and over time it could normalize transparency, foster connection, and create a society where finding like-minded people is far less daunting. The idea is simple, actionable, and already partially in practice. it just needs to be extended, standardized, and socially embraced.

Privacy as fear

Now, some may argue that odznaczkowanie represents an infringement on privacy. At first glance, it might seem that displaying key aspects of oneself openly could expose personal information, but this brings us to the broader point of this section: the conventional concept of privacy is, in many ways, overrated. Not in the trivial sense of withholding information from others arbitrarily, but in the practical sense that the phrase “if you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear” is remarkably accurate when applied thoughtfully. Fear of privacy loss is not entirely unfounded in our current system, especially given government censorship and the manipulation inherent in representative democracies that often operate more as a sectarian management class than as a body acting in the public interest. Yet the complete abolition of privacy, in the sense I advocate, would only occur after systemic restructuring along the lines I have outlined elsewhere: mass surveillance should not serve control but clarity, and it should serve the people rather than obscure or intimidate them.

Surveillance, if handled properly, can be liberating rather than oppressive. Imagine a system where everything is recorded not to punish or manipulate, but to be documented and accessible. The information exists, and acknowledging its existence openly is far healthier than pretending it does not. Take, for instance, the internet meme or song that jokingly states, “The government knows when you masturbate.” My response is simple: so what? Why would it matter, and why should anyone care? The principle here is that privacy, as traditionally conceived, is largely a hypothetical

ideal. No government has ever genuinely allowed citizens full discretion over their actions; surveillance has always existed in some form, often hidden, often unacknowledged. To act as if it does not exist is to be ignorant. At the same time, history shows that widespread monitoring has rarely resulted in direct, personal harm. Privacy laws are mostly symbolic; they exist as a social reassurance, but they do not and cannot eliminate surveillance, nor can the state regulate itself from the highest levels of power. In practical terms, acknowledging surveillance openly and centralizing it could actually enhance privacy and control for the individual: the number of people with access would decrease, while the visibility and utility of the information for the person it concerns would increase.

I propose that the government openly acknowledge mass surveillance, framing it not as a watchman state but as a tool for empowerment. Citizens should know that their actions are recorded and be given access to that information for legal, personal, or therapeutic purposes. This transparency transforms surveillance from a tool of fear into a mechanism for agency: knowledge of oneself and one's environment becomes actionable rather than hidden. Individuals could leverage their own data as a resource, whether to verify legal claims, manage personal information, or engage with social systems more effectively. Information should not be treated as a commodity, nor as something to hoard; it should exist to serve the people, facilitating social navigation, accountability, and self-management. The technical reality is that most recorded data is irrelevant in daily life; governments and organizations rarely monitor individuals with precision, and what they do capture primarily serves to observe collective trends, emergencies, and systemic behaviors. Thus, centralizing and responsibly managing this data both limits unnecessary access by multiple entities and provides practical utility for citizens.

Surveillance, in this context, should have structured applications. There should be a clear terrorism watchlist, focused on actual criminal activity such as illegal goods distribution or organized threats, rather than targeting trivial online behaviors. A separate mental health watchlist could identify individuals exhibiting signs of severe depression, suicidal tendencies, or extreme antisocial behavior, with the goal of intervention and treatment

rather than punishment. Beyond security and health, technology could be leveraged for convenience: facial recognition could streamline payments, passports, or other administrative tasks, providing benefits analogous to those seen in China without being an issue, because as much shit as China gets for this, there is nothing wrong with it, the Chinese government is a sectarian subcultural government of the elite, but less so that western countries. Drones and other public technologies could patrol streets, not merely to observe but to assist people in real time, provide directions, or deliver services, creating a dual purpose of public utility and potential revenue generation. Internet activity, with user consent, could be integrated with AI systems to optimize digital life management, offering tailored guidance, resource organization, or automated assistance, drawing on comprehensive activity records to enhance personal productivity and decision-making.

In essence, abolishing the traditional conception of privacy does not mean exposing oneself to harm; it means reclaiming control over the information already gathered about us and ensuring it serves practical and constructive purposes. Surveillance becomes a shared tool: it documents, it empowers, it prevents harm, and it provides accessibility. By reframing the relationship between citizens and information, privacy transforms from a guarded secret into a functional resource.

Active and passive class

Now for something more interesting, I will touch on Nietzsche, or rather what I understand about him. Most people are familiar with the general idea associated with him, the distinction between the Übermensch and what is often interpreted as the lesser or herd man. The Übermensch, or “superior man,” is commonly described as an individual who refuses to simply drift along with society. He takes his life into his own hands, rejects passive conformity, and creates meaning through action, struggle, and self-assertion. In contrast, the so-called inferior man is described as someone who goes along with the crowd, letting life push him in whatever direction

fate dictates, accepting the norms and rhythms of society rather than rebelling against them. At least that is the simplified explanation I have usually heard in discussion.

The core distinction Nietzsche makes between the stubborn non-conformist and the calm “go with the flow” crowd is, in my view, a real phenomenon. Societies do tend to produce these two kinds of tendencies, and in fact such a division is probably inevitable. Some people are pushed toward conflict, transformation, and ambition through being the ‘in tragedy’, while others are pushed toward stability, routine, and continuity through being the ‘in suffering’. This distinction also feeds into an argument often made by elitist thinkers, where the non-conformists become the natural rulers, the individuals who stand above society and guide the masses. In that vision the conformist majority becomes the passive body of the population, the ones who allow themselves to be led.

However, I would describe my own position as something like a reverse Nietzscheanism. The structure is similar, but the moral hierarchy is inverted. Before getting to the point itself, there needs to be some groundwork. In another section of my writing I discussed the idea of the “cult of struggle,” and this connects strongly to the philosophical pessimism associated with Schopenhauer. Schopenhauer famously argued that life is fundamentally suffering, an endless cycle of desire and frustration. In this he was essentially correct, at least in the sense that struggle is an unavoidable component of existence.

Where I diverge from many other thinkers, including people like Julius Evola, is in the interpretation of this fact. Some people look at suffering and say that it gives life meaning, that there is something noble or glorious about enduring hardship. This is the mentality I describe as the cult of struggle. According to that view, pain itself becomes a kind of virtue, and hardship is romanticized as proof of moral worth. I reject this entirely. There is no inherent glory in suffering. Struggle exists, but that does not mean it should be worshipped.

I openly admit that I am a comfortist, and I am proud of that. Life should not be an endless celebration of hardship. Instead there should be a constant

tug of war against struggle. This does not mean struggle is evil in a moral sense. Most things in life are not strictly good or evil, they are simply forces that either work for you or against you. In the same way that the national collective operates as a force that serves your interests through aggregate ego, struggle operates as a force that works against you. No one actually enjoys struggling. When people claim they do, they are usually engaging in psychological coping mechanisms to justify circumstances they cannot escape.

Romanticizing struggle often functions as a kind of social sadism. It becomes a way of telling others that their suffering is somehow virtuous, which conveniently allows those promoting the ideology to avoid addressing the suffering itself. In extreme cases it even becomes a subtle form of misanthropy, a worldview where human happiness is treated with suspicion while hardship is treated as morally purifying. I reject that mentality. Instead, both the state and potentially individual should be engaged in an ongoing effort to reduce unnecessary struggle and maximize collective convenience.

This creates an interesting problem. If struggle is inevitable, and if competition itself is a form of struggle, how can a society oppose struggle while wanting to minimize competition? Competition inevitably produces winners and losers, which means conflict continues indefinitely. At first glance it seems impossible to escape this dilemma. Yet this is precisely where the distinction between active and passive social roles becomes important.

In my view, society should consciously structure itself around two broad forces. The passive force and the active force. Contrary to Nietzsche’s hierarchy, the passive force would actually represent the ideal condition of life.

The passive class would be the protected class. They would represent the social majority whose purpose is not to struggle but to live well. Their lives would ideally be calm, stable, and secure. Their role is not to dominate or conquer but to sustain civilization through ordinary life. They preserve

culture, maintain families, reproduce social norms, and enjoy the freedoms that civilization provides.

Their stability would rest on three core pillars. First is love, meaning a stable mutual support network between individuals, typically expressed through long-term partnership or marriage. Second is God, not necessarily in a rigid theological sense but as a metaphysical framework that helps people interpret suffering and death. Humans naturally seek meaning beyond material life, especially when confronted with unavoidable pain (tragedy rather than struggle), and religious structures historically fulfilled this role. Third is community, meaning belonging within both the national collective and the smaller structures of local life such as towns or villages.

The passive class therefore represents the social goal. It is what everyone should strive toward. A calm life surrounded by stability, family, and cultural continuity. Their tranquility becomes the purpose of the state itself. Civilization exists so that ordinary people can live peacefully rather than being forced into endless struggle.

In an ideal world only this passive force would exist. Unfortunately reality does not permit that. Conflict, danger, and external pressures always arise. Because of this, society also requires an active force.

The active force would consist of a small voluntary minority who take on the burdens of struggle on behalf of everyone else. These individuals become the guardians of the system. They engage in governance, defense, and high-stakes decision making so that the majority does not have to. In a sense they absorb the tragedy of political life so that others can remain removed from it.

Interestingly, many people who’d enter this role do not consciously choose it in the beginning. It often emerges gradually. Someone might find themselves lying awake at night, strangely fascinated by politics, administration, or the functioning of society because via their lack of luck, they have become the tragic and not the suffering. They slowly become drawn into it in a hopes to if not fix their own situation, prevent others from facing tragedy. They start paying attention to things others never need to or

should. Eventually they realize they have developed a sense of duty toward something larger than themselves.

When that realization occurs, they often also recognize that they have very little to lose personally. Their lives cannot benefit from the pursuit of comfort because fate had landed them to being unable to gain the social safety nets. Instead they feel compelled to serve something greater, whether that is the nation, civilization, or history itself, for they cannot serve themselves. In a symbolic sense this process resembles a kind of calling, almost like the religious idea of a chosen messenger. It is probably the closest secular equivalent to what older traditions described as divine selection.

Those who accept this role become what could be described as sacrificial guardians. They give up the peaceful life of the passive class in order to defend and maintain the system that allows that peaceful life to exist. In exchange they receive recognition, prestige, and cultural honor. Songs, monuments, and collective memory acknowledge their sacrifice.

In this sense they resemble martyrs of the state. They are not rulers in the sense of dominating society, but servants of the people. Their loyalty flows downward toward the passive class rather than upward toward themselves. They are the grass and water that the sheep feed upon to sustain themselves, not the wolves ruling the flock.

Because of this structure, they cannot really be called “inferior” in a moral sense. I am fundamentally egalitarian in that respect. No human being is inherently inferior. However their role is subordinate in a functional sense. Their purpose is service rather than ambition.

This reverses Nietzsche’s hierarchy almost completely. In his framework the herd exists below the exceptional individual. In my framework the herd, or rather the stable civilian majority, is the protected center of civilization. The subservient individuals exist to defend it.

For this system to work, it must prevent the active class from transforming into a permanent elite. History shows that ruling classes inevitably begin

serving themselves if they remain in power too long. To counter this tendency, the structure would rely on rapid generational turnover.

Here Edmund Burke's observations about tradition become relevant. Burke argued that traditions accumulate wisdom over time and should not be recklessly destroyed by each generation. That insight is correct, but it does not mean society should remain static. Instead, traditions should function as a foundation upon which each generation adds its own layer.

In practice this means older structures remain intact while younger cohorts gradually reshape them. Positions of authority would therefore favor individuals in their twenties and thirties rather than those who have spent decades accumulating power. Age limits and rotation would prevent institutions from becoming rigid oligarchies.

This approach resembles the cultural respect for elders found in some societies, such as Japan, but inverted. Instead of automatically privileging age, the system would privilege vitality. Youth tends to bring energy, creativity, and willingness to act, which are necessary qualities for those who must carry the burdens of the active class.

Decentralization would also be crucial. Institutions should function primarily through trust and shared norms rather than rigid bureaucratic control. In a decentralized system, a single unstable individual cannot easily impose destructive policies because the surrounding network of people will naturally resist or isolate that person.

One remaining concern is how to prevent each new generation from radically dismantling the system altogether. The answer lies in cultural formation. Some people would describe this as indoctrination, but in reality all societies educate their members into certain values. The key difference is what those values emphasize.

Instead of dictating every specific behavior or ideological position, the education system would focus on demonstrating the consequences of social instability. People would learn what hypergamy, extreme hedonism, social fragmentation, or foreign domination actually do to the average

person over time. They would see the long term social effects of these patterns rather than simply hearing moral condemnation.

This creates a population that understands why certain norms exist. When people grasp the structural consequences of social behavior, they are more likely to maintain stability voluntarily.

Administration, after all, is a profession like any other. When someone enters a courtroom they do not expect to wear cosplay, and similarly someone in public office should not promote values that degrade the social order they are responsible for maintaining.

Will via loyalty

When it comes to what I call will via loyalty, there is actually less original theory to invent here because the underlying social phenomenon has already been widely discussed by sociologists and philosophers. Anyone interested in the structural side of this should look into the concepts of liquid modernity and anomie. These terms describe the same broad condition from slightly different angles.

Liquid modernity, a term most closely associated with the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman, refers to a stage of modern society in which social structures that once provided stability have become fluid and constantly changing. In earlier eras, identities, communities, and roles were relatively solid. A person's job, family structure, religion, and local community tended to remain stable for long periods of time, often across generations. In liquid modernity these structures dissolve or become temporary. Careers are flexible and uncertain, relationships become short term, communities are easily abandoned, and identities are constantly reinvented. Everything becomes mobile and provisional.

Anomie is a related concept developed by the sociologist Émile Durkheim. It describes a condition where social norms weaken or collapse to the point that individuals no longer know what is expected of them. When shared standards disappear, people lose the sense of direction that comes from living inside a stable moral framework. The result is alienation, confusion,

and often depression. Durkheim originally studied this in relation to suicide rates, noticing that people were far more psychologically stable when they existed inside structured social environments that gave their actions meaning.

Both of these concepts describe the same basic reality: modern life has become unstable in ways that previous societies rarely experienced. While agreeing with both totally I would frame the issue slightly differently, or perhaps symbolically, because the problem is not simply structural but motivational. It is not just that institutions have become fluid, that's half the problem, because institutions are made by people, and people have foregone loyalty that, in radical situations must be metaphorically beaten into them.

I reference Japan too often, but the comparison is useful here. When Sanae Takaichi once emphasized the phrase "work, work, and more work,". I reject that framing entirely. The idea that work itself should be the ultimate organizing principle of life is part of the same struggle cult mentality discussed earlier. Instead of that, using the same template, if there must be a central cultural value, mine would be very simple: **loyalty, loyalty, and more loyalty.**

One of the reasons modern life feels so exhausting is that work, relationships, and identity have all become intensely competitive arenas. In theory a certain level of competition can be healthy when it is voluntary and used to measure competence or ability. But the modern system has pushed this so far that participation itself becomes draining. People expend enormous emotional and psychological energy simply trying to enter social spaces before they even begin maintaining their place in them.

Think about friendships, careers, or even romantic relationships. The process of finding them often requires so much effort, filtering, comparison, and self presentation that by the time someone succeeds they are already exhausted. The energy that should go into building and maintaining the relationship is spent merely trying to access it. In many cases people simply withdraw from the process entirely because the cost of entry feels too high.

This is not primarily a technological problem. Technology accelerates it, but the deeper cause is the erosion of loyalty as a cultural value. People are no longer loyal to themselves, to their communities, or even to their own commitments. Everything becomes provisional and negotiable.

That is where the concept of will via loyalty comes in. Will by itself is simply energy. It is the human capacity to act, strive, and pursue goals. But energy alone is directionless. A person can possess tremendous willpower and still end up scattered across dozens of different pursuits, constantly chasing new opportunities without committing to any of them long enough to produce stability.

Loyalty is what gives will a direction. It acts as a stabilizing axis that prevents a person from dissolving into endless impulses. When someone becomes loyal to something, whether that is a partner, a community, a belief, or even a personal discipline, their actions begin to follow a consistent trajectory over time. That consistency creates stability not only for the individual but for everyone around them.

The deeper issue in modern society is not simply that loyalty has declined. It is that loyalty itself has become culturally suspicious. Contemporary ideology often frames loyalty as something naive or even oppressive. People are encouraged to constantly reevaluate every commitment they make and this is evil.

Relationships are treated as temporary arrangements. Jobs are described as stepping stones rather than roles to grow within. Identities are framed as experiments that can be discarded and replaced indefinitely. The cultural message becomes very clear: keep every door open at all times.

But a life where every door must remain open is a life where nothing is ever truly chosen. Loyalty requires closing doors. It requires saying that certain paths will not be taken because one path has been selected instead. That act of narrowing possibilities is precisely what makes a person a person and not just a wondering husk.

Of course loyalty cannot simply be forced by law. Loyalty imposed externally becomes obedience, and obedience is not the same thing. A

government can compel behavior, but it cannot manufacture genuine commitment. What a stable society can do is cultivate an environment where loyalty is socially respected and expected.

In such an environment people still make their own choices, but those choices become meaningful because they are reinforced rather than undermined by the surrounding culture. When someone commits to a relationship, a profession, or a community, the social expectation is that this commitment carries weight. It is not something to abandon lightly simply because a more convenient option appears.

This is why the real driver of disloyalty is ideological rather than technological. Technology certainly contributes to instability. Increased mobility allows people to leave communities easily. Digital communication makes relationships replaceable. Online platforms constantly expose individuals to alternative lifestyles and opportunities.

However technology itself does not contain values. It is simply a tool that amplifies the prevailing cultural mindset. The real issue is the ideology of limitless individual autonomy, where any limitation is treated as oppression. In that worldview loyalty begins to look irrational because loyalty inherently restricts future options.

Reversing technological development would be both impossible and undesirable. A society that rejects technological advancement would simply become weak as well as less robust to pursue collective convenience .The goal should not be to abandon modern tools but to shape their effects through cultural norms and regulatory structures.

Technology can be guided in ways that slow the dissolution of stable relationships while still allowing progress. Communities can still exist in digital environments, families can remain intact despite mobility, and institutions can maintain continuity even in rapidly changing economies. But this only works if loyalty is treated as a virtue rather than a weakness.

In that sense loyalty is not the enemy of freedom. It is the structure that makes meaningful freedom possible. Freedom without loyalty becomes

endless drifting, where every decision must be reconsidered and nothing lasts long enough to matter.

When individuals voluntarily choose loyalty, whether to a partner, a nation, a community, or an ideal, they narrow the range of their possibilities. But by narrowing it they make their life path real. Their will stops scattering across countless impulses and begins moving in a clear direction.

There is also another dimension to loyalty that goes beyond stability, and it may be even more important. Loyalty is not only something that makes life structured and predictable, it is also the ultimate expression of personal authenticity. A person only becomes a coherent individual when they commit themselves to something that endures over time.

Modern culture often praises openness to everything. People are told to keep all possibilities available, to never limit themselves, to constantly reinvent who they are. At first this sounds liberating, but taken to its logical conclusion it produces the opposite effect. When someone is open to absolutely everything, they ultimately become nothing. They lose any fixed character because their identity constantly shifts depending on the surrounding environment.

A person in that condition becomes more like a social fluid than a stable individual. They are shaped by trends, by peer pressure, by the immediate incentives of the moment. Instead of acting from an internal center, they react to external stimuli. In that sense they become a kind of tool for whatever cultural current happens to dominate at the time. They become socially malleable, easily pushed in different directions, but without any consistent internal structure.

Loyalty prevents this dissolution of the self. When a person commits themselves to something enduring, whether that is a relationship, a community, a nation, a belief, or even a personal code, they create continuity between their past and their future. Their actions start to follow a recognizable pattern because they are anchored by commitments that remain constant. That continuity is what creates authenticity.

Authenticity does not come from endless experimentation. It comes from the willingness to remain faithful to something even when doing so becomes inconvenient. Loyalty to oneself means remaining consistent with one's own character rather than constantly reshaping it to match the expectations of the moment. Loyalty to others means giving relationships a real foundation, something stronger than temporary mutual benefit.

Because of this, loyalty might be understood as the most virtuous value among all values. It is the quality that allows other virtues to exist in a meaningful way. Courage without loyalty is reckless ambition. Love without loyalty is lust. Responsibility without loyalty becomes bureaucratic duty. Loyalty gives depth to all of them because it binds action to commitment.

It is also important that loyalty operates in a total and holistic way. It cannot exist as a purely isolated trait. A person who is loyal only when convenient is not truly loyal. Loyalty shapes the entire orientation of a life. It determines how someone approaches friendships, partnerships, work, and civic responsibility. When loyalty is present, relationships become meaningful because they are not easily discarded. When it disappears, relationships become transactional and temporary.

This is why the cultural shift that treats loyalty as something burdensome is so destructive. Somewhere along the path of modern development, loyalty began to be reframed as a limitation rather than a virtue. Commitments were recast as restrictions on freedom. Long term bonds were portrayed as obstacles to personal fulfillment. The idea that one should remain faithful to people, communities, or traditions began to look outdated or even naive.

It is difficult to pinpoint exactly where this shift originated. It likely developed gradually through a mixture of economic transformation, cultural ideology, and technological change. As societies became more mobile and more individualistic, the structures that once required long term loyalty weakened. Over time the culture adapted by redefining loyalty itself as something suspicious.

From that perspective the erosion of loyalty could be described as one of the defining pathologies of modernity. If earlier civilizations struggled with

oppression or rigid hierarchy, modern societies struggle with dissolution. Instead of being trapped inside overly strict systems, individuals now drift within systems that are too loose to provide meaning.

In that context the rejection of loyalty becomes a kind of ultimate degeneration. When loyalty disappears, people no longer experience life as a coherent narrative. They move through a series of disconnected phases, relationships, and identities without any lasting center. Communities fragment, families weaken, and institutions lose legitimacy because nothing is expected to endure.

History of Social Nationalism

The last part of this document is less theoretical and less administrative. Instead of outlining philosophical ideas or institutional structures, it is simply a recounting of events as I remember them. It is not meant to be a personal biography or a reflection on my feelings about different periods of my life. Rather, it is an explanation of how the ideology described in these documents, Social Nationalism in the sense of my own formulation, what I sometimes call Ziółkowskiism, actually came to exist.

It is important to clarify from the beginning that this refers specifically to my version of Social Nationalism, not the broader or historically established uses of the phrase. The term “social nationalism” has been used in different contexts before. Some people use it loosely to mean left wing nationalism, while others associate it with specific movements such as Syrian Social Nationalist Party or other groups that use similar terminology. None of those are directly related to what I mean here. The label ended up being the same, but the ideology itself developed independently through a very different path.

The story begins around 2016 or 2017, when I first started becoming interested in politics. This interest did not begin through internet communities or ideological reading, but rather through school, specifically history class. Certain historical events discussed in class caught my attention, and from there I began reading more about history on my own.

As often happens, interest in history gradually led into interest in politics, since political ideas are inseparable from historical developments.

Between roughly 2017 and 2019 nothing particularly important happened from an ideological standpoint. Like many teenagers who begin exploring political ideas online, I drifted between different labels and ideological frameworks. I read about various systems and occasionally tried to see whether any of them matched my own views. However, none of them felt entirely correct eventually. Either they only partially reflected what I believed, or they required accepting assumptions that did not make sense to me.

During that period I was gradually forming my own positions through debates, discussions, and the general political questions that appear frequently in online spaces. By the time 2019 arrived, I had already started describing myself as a “nationalist without adjectives” which I still do today in casual conversation. The phrase reflected the fact that I believed in nationalism as a general principle but did not feel that any of the existing ideological subcategories fully captured my views or rather that I didn’t know which.

In 2019 I became active in an online community on the platform Reddit called PoliticalCompassMemes. The community revolved around political memes based on the well known political compass format, which divides ideologies along two axes. At the time the subreddit functioned as a fairly open environment for political discussion and humor. This was before the large scale tightening of moderation that occurred across Reddit around 2020.

Through that community I eventually became involved with another related project called PoliticalCompassBalls, which was modeled after the countryball meme format. In that space ideologies were personified as characters, and users contributed both memes and written descriptions.

Rather than trying to select one of the existing ideological labels available within that environment, I decided to make a post describing my own political views directly and asking the users to simply assign me a label

based on those positions. At that time those views could be described as a proto form of what would later become Social Nationalism. In the comments of that post another user responded that the ideas I described were similar to something he had been calling Social Nationalism within that community.

The two of us discovered that our views overlapped almost completely, and we began cooperating. Shortly afterward we created a separate subreddit called RevivalistFront. That space was intended as a broader forum for nationalist discussion rather than something tied exclusively to the meme communities we had originally come from. In retrospect the atmosphere there resembled a kind of proto universal nationalism, meaning that nationalists of different tendencies could interact and debate.

At the same time we started influencing the internal culture of the PoliticalCompassBalls community itself. Within that community ideologies were represented as characters, and each one had a page on a fan wiki explaining its ideas. Because the label Social Nationalism had already been created as a cosmetic tag within the community, it technically qualified to have a wiki page.

There was no rule preventing users from writing a description of their own ideology themselves. At that point the idea of self inserted ideologies had not yet become a thing, not on the wiki at least. As a result nothing prevented us, or more accurately me since I was the one doing the actual writing and editing, from simply documenting our views and presenting them as an ideology on the official wiki.

That decision ended up creating an unexpected trend. Once the Social Nationalism page appeared, other users began creating their own self insert ideologies as well. In hindsight I am not entirely sure whether that was a positive development. The community became increasingly chaotic as more personal ideologies appeared. In any case the trend eventually became part of the culture of the wiki itself.

For a while I remained active in those communities, but the situation changed dramatically in 2020. During that year large scale political unrest

in the United States, particularly the events associated with the George Floyd protests and the broader Black Lives Matter movement, triggered widespread policy changes on many internet platforms. Reddit in particular began implementing significantly stricter moderation rules.

As those changes spread, many political communities were either heavily restricted or banned outright. I was eventually banned from the PoliticalCompassBalls environment during that period. Because of this I shifted my activity primarily to RevivalistFront and occasionally back to PoliticalCompassMemes.

However that environment also deteriorated quickly. By late 2020 and possibly early 2021 the broader PoliticalCompassMemes ecosystem had begun collapsing under increasing moderation pressure. Around the same time RevivalistFront was also banned. When that happened I lost contact with the original user who had helped develop the Social Nationalism label. Shortly afterward he disappeared from the internet entirely.

From that point forward the label effectively remained under my control alone. Without the reformist faction that he represented, Social Nationalism became synonymous with my own interpretation of it. In earlier discussions we had distinguished between two versions of the ideology.

The first was Reformist Social Nationalism, which was his preferred approach. That version envisioned achieving the system through electoral politics combined with gradual institutional infiltration, essentially building a supportive administrative structure inside the existing state.

The second was Revolutionary Social Nationalism, which was the version I favored. That approach assumed that the existing political structure could not realistically be transformed through elections alone and would instead require a coup or revolutionary restructuring.

Once he disappeared, Reformist Social Nationalism effectively ceased to exist as a distinct concept, leaving only the revolutionary version. From then on the term Social Nationalism referred solely to that interpretation.

Around 2022 I returned to the PoliticalCompassBalls ecosystem through a Discord community colloquially known as the Duck server. I remained somewhat active there and eventually helped establish another offshoot project called FPCB in around 2024(?). However I eventually left that space as well after becoming dissatisfied with its direction, particularly after a funding controversy that prevented the project from being revived properly.

After that I moved briefly through other related spaces such as Primwiki and Mizocord, but by that point I was already distancing Social Nationalism from the entire PoliticalCompass environment. The ideology had developed far enough that it no longer depended on those communities.

At that stage I had already begun writing longer documents describing the system in detail, including what eventually became the Chapters on Social Nationalism. From that point onward the ideology existed as a standalone concept rather than something tied to internet meme communities.

Although the core ideas have evolved somewhat since 2019, the overall framework has remained consistent. The changes have mostly involved expanding the administrative and philosophical detail rather than altering the basic principles. At its foundation Social Nationalism still combines nationalism with a social market economic structure, meaning a system similar to welfare capitalism or what is sometimes called Rhine capitalism.

The meaning of the word “social” in Social Nationalism has also evolved over time. Originally the term was intended as a reference to social democracy. At that stage the concept could loosely be summarized as social democracy without democracy, meaning a welfare oriented economic system operating inside an authoritarian political structure.

Over time it became clearer that the more accurate description of the economic model was the social market economy rather than social democracy itself. The word “social” therefore shifted to refer more directly to that economic orientation.

Around 2022 another meaning was added to the term. In addition to referring to the social market economy, “social” also came to represent the supremacy of sociocultural law over purely economic dogma. In other

words, economic activity should serve the cultural and social structure of the nation rather than dominating it. This concept is closely tied to the idea of the Kultokrat, the primacy of cultural authority within the state.

Because of this development the word “social” in Social Nationalism now carries two meanings simultaneously. It refers both to the economic framework of the social market economy and to the broader principle that sociocultural law and national cohesion take precedence over purely economic considerations. Combined with nationalism itself, these elements form the ideological core that I have been describing throughout these documents.

THE TRAGEDIERS

Hubert Ziółkowski

Brief discussion about odznaczkowanie, privacy as fear, active and passive class of society, a sort of reverse nietzscheism. The idea of will via loyalty, which is oftenplace elsewhere named as liquid modernity and the brief online history of Social Nationalism

Original distributed version upon release on 19th of March